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much to be desired: Inflation and interest rates
both topped 20 percent. High inflation typically
damages economic growth. Greece was no excep-
tion. Its real GDP growth averaged 0.7 percent
annual rate between 1980 and 1994.
High interest rates compounded the govern-
ment’s fiscal problems by raising borrowing costs
on its very substantial debt. Annual government
budget deficits often exceeded 10 percent of out-
put. Annual peacetime budget deficits in excess
of 10 percent of GDP are large for any country.
As a result of many years of these large deficits,
the Greek gross public sector debt stood at about
88 percent of GDP by 1995. In 1995, the GDP-
weighted average ratio of debt to GDP in the
European Union was 73 percent; other counties
with high ratios were Belgium at 135 percent,
Italy at 122 percent and the Netherlands at 90
percent.1
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty set forth the
mechanisms by which member states would tran-
sition to a single European currency, the euro.
Specifically, the treaty laid down so-called con-
vergence criteria to which all countries had to
conform before joining the European Monetary
Union, the EMU. The criteria required that every
member state have inflation and interest rates
similar to those of the best performing members,
sound public finances, a period of exchange rate
stability and appropriate legislation with respect
to its central bank.
I
am honored to be here this evening to
accept the Fred Heldring Award from the
Global Interdependence Center. I applaud
the work of the Center in promoting events
and communication about international economic
and financial interdependence.
Because tonight’s festivities celebrate Greece,
I thought that I might say a few words about the
remarkable turnaround of Greece’s economic
performance, a success that is closely linked to
entry into the European Monetary Union at the
start of 2001.
As usual, I want to emphasize that the views
I express here are mine and do not necessarily
reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve
System. I thank my colleagues at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their comments.
Christopher J. Neely, assistant vice president in
the Research Division, provided special assistance.
I retain full responsibility for errors.
I know that this event is not the occasion for
a formal lecture, but once you give a lawyer’s son
and former professor turned central banker a
soapbox, you have accepted a certain risk. I prom-
ise not to present a lecture, but cannot resist a few
remarks. And what is on my mind is how very
well the creation of the euro has worked out, for
Greece and the other member countries.
Consider the Greek economic situation in
the 1980s and early 1990s, prior to the decision
to attempt to join the euro zone. During this
period, Greek monetary and fiscal policy left
1 The following countries were members of the EU in 1995: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The paragraph cites debt-to-GDP data from the OECD. Eurostat,
however, reports a much higher estimate of Greece’s 1995 debt-to-GDP ratio, 109 percent. The OECD number is much lower because the OECD
reports large upward revisions to Greek GDP that Eurostat has not yet accepted.While Greece expressed interest in monetary
union even before the Maastricht Treaty was
signed, the country was plainly unable to meet the
convergence criteria in the early 1990s. As already
noted, inflation and interest rates exceeded 20
percent and public finances were in terrible shape.
Some observers even suggested that by the early
1990s Greece had the largest imbalances of any
industrial country (Hochreiter and Tavlas, 2004).
In the mid-1990s, there was no guarantee
that Greece would succeed in meeting the con-
vergence criteria, despite a general desire to inte-
grate more closely with Europe and to achieve
better economic performance.
Although Greece had begun reducing inflation
in the early 1990s, in 1995 the governor of the
Bank of Greece, Lucas Papademos, took a serious
step toward economic reform by introducing the
“Hard Drachma Policy.” This monetary policy
program, which entailed annual targets for infla-
tion and exchange rates, made rapid progress
against inflation, reducing it from over 10 percent
in 1995 to less than 5 percent by the start of 1998.
Yet, despite the fact that Greece could not
immediately meet the convergence criteria,
Greece’s socialist prime minister, Costas Simitas,
made complying with them a political priority.
Joining the monetary union would help integrate
Greece’s economy with those of the other mem-
bers. It would lower the costs of international
trade for consumers and businesses, facilitate
international price comparisons, and raise living
standards. The policy package included a number
of complementary structural reforms to Greek
energy and telecommunications markets.
The Greek public largely supported these
government reforms. As one might expect, sup-
port was strongest among the business commu-
nity, but moderate socialists also supported the
plan. Farmers and left-wing activists constituted
the main opponents, fearing job losses from
increased competition and capital mobility.
Some observers, including many economists,
also expressed the traditional concern about
monetary unions: that they require a “one size
fits all” monetary policy among the members.
This concern seemed especially pressing for a
small country, like Greece, trying to join a mone-
tary union of larger and wealthier countries.
Fiscal policy—government taxes and spend-
ing—is often considered another tool of macro-
economic management. The EMU, however,
adopted the “Stability and Growth Pact,” a 1997
treaty that was designed to ensure that govern-
ments would continue to behave in ways con-
sistent with the stability of the euro. The pact
effectively limits government deficits to 3 percent
of GDP, which restricts countercyclical fiscal
policy. Thus, euro skeptics were concerned that
the EMU would handcuff both monetary and fiscal
policy, fostering unstable economic conditions.
Even Governor Papademos (Wall Street
Journal Europe, February 12, 2001) admitted to
some concern on this point: “I’m a little bit con-
cerned that in the course of the year that if there’s
a severe shock or an unanticipated domestic
development, it may not be possible for fiscal
policy to be implemented with the required degree
of prudence.” The requirement of restrictive fiscal
and monetary policies to join the monetary union
drew the most direct criticism. Labor unions, in
particular, fought the new policies with strikes
and political rallies.
The national airline, Olympic Airways,
became a focal point of the struggle as the govern-
ment sought to cut costs and turn it into a profit-
making enterprise. Employees at the firm
responded with frequent work stoppages. In 1998,
Greece’s foreign minister, Theodoros Pangalos,
even joked that “no logical person” would ride
Olympic Airways, given the poor service (Laredo
Morning Times, May 1, 1998).
Criticism of Greece’s entry to the monetary
union came from outside the country as well.
Early in 2000, the German Chambers of Industry
and Commerce urged the German government to
block Greece’s entry to EMU, citing Greece’s
extremely large public debt. These groups were
concerned that Greece’s large public debt might
create pressure to inflate the euro.
The economic reforms of the 1990s were
ultimately successful in bringing Greece into
compliance with the convergence criteria. On
January 1, 2001, Greece officially became a mem-
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2ber of the euro zone. As with previous members,
the drachma-denominated notes and the euro
notes circulated side by side for two months,
until the euro became the sole currency on
March 1, 2001.
The Greek economy has flourished since it
entered the euro zone in 2001. Inflation has
averaged 3.3 percent, compared with the 1990-
2000 average of 10.4 percent. GDP growth has
averaged 4.4 percent, compared with 2.2 percent
in the prior period. Unemployment has fallen
from its 1999 peak of 12.3 percent to 8.6 percent
by the end of 2006. While this jobless figure is
higher than anyone wants, it is likely to decline
further in the environment of price stability that
the European Central Bank fosters.
In September 2004, the Greek government
released revised national accounts that showed
that Greece had actually entered the euro zone
with a budget deficit that exceeded the limit of
3 percent of GDP set forth by the Stability and
Growth Pact guidelines. These revisions have
caused some consternation among the member
states. Still, it cannot be argued that entry into
the EMU was a mistake. The Greek economy is
not performing just marginally better, but enor-
mously better.
European countries continue to see benefits
from adopting the euro. The 10 countries that
entered the European Union in 2004 have all
expressed their intention to join the full monetary
union within ten years. Slovenia, which joined
the euro zone on January 1 of this year, was the
first of these new members.
I was fortunate to study under Milton
Friedman, and I remember well one of his favorite
sayings: The proof of the pudding is in the eating.
For Greece, the EMU pudding has been very
tasty indeed.
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